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Abstract 
 This paper investigates the academic conclusions on how CEO gender and salary affect 
firm value, while at the same time adding data on how CEO age affects firm value. Via an event 
study of S&P 500 CEO changes from 2000 to 2006 I confirm the current academic findings and 
discover that CEOs promoted during their 40s negatively influence firm value, while CEOs in 
older age brackets show a positive abnormal return on firm value. With this validation and 
addition to the existing data, firms and investors can more effectively assess proper candidates for 
the position of CEO and allocate resources accordingly. 
I.  Introduction 
Chief Executive Officers are responsible for maximizing their firm’s value. 
While this core function applies to all workers in a firm, the CEO ultimately is 
responsible for this central task of business, and reports directly to the board of the 
directors of their firm (Lin 2014). Due to CEOs bearing this ultimate accountability, 
they are commonly given broad authority within their companies and are charged with 
the overarching leadership, strategy, and direction of their firm. Furthermore CEOs are 
on average paid 331 times more than the national average production and 
nonsupervisory worker (AFL-CIO 2014). Knowing this, one would expect that the 
choice of who to select as CEO warrants a significant amount of research and a careful 
selection process. If this appointment occurs within a public company, markets will 
adjust the price of that company’s stock to incorporate the aggregation of investor 
assessments of the CEOs ability to create value within their firm.   
Given the importance of the CEO, it is worth investigating which characteristics 
of CEOs appear to impact the value CEOs create. The existing body of literature on 
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CEOs’ effects on company value has shown that they do have the capacity to boost this 
value. Academics have investigated specific manager traits such as gender and whether 
they possess an MBA and identified what factors influence firm value most, (Bertrand 
and Schoar 2002). There have been no market-wide event studies conducted on CEO 
announcements due to researchers focusing on certain aspects of CEO turnover, such as 
announcements related to firings. These papers are not unified in their conclusions; 
with some indicating CEO announcements have no effects on stock returns while others 
find positive results (Denis,Denis and Sarin 1997, Worrell Davidson and Glasscock 
1993). Furthermore, higher CEO salaries have been associated with underperforming 
creation of value within a firm, a conclusion that should have a large impact on how 
firms compensate CEOs. (Core Holthausen Larcker 1999).With this paper I hope to add 
literature that enables companies to select CEOs with traits most suited to providing 
value, and appropriately compensate them,  as well as direct investors in their allocation 
of resources surrounding new CEOs. 
In this paper I use an event study with a Carhart (1997) four-factor model of 
normal returns to examine abnormal returns of firms surrounding the announcement of 
new CEOs. The sample includes all 122 CEO changes within the S&P 500 from 
January 1st 2000 through December 31st 2006. This sample allows me to draw 
conclusions about large public firms across the economy, and while my conclusions are 
limited, they apply to companies where a significant amount of the investment in the 
United States’ economy occurs. Studies before have predicted a diversity of stock 
reactions to executive announcements, yet none of them have done a broad, market-
wide event study as I am undertaking in this analysis. The results of my event study 
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will allow me to draw conclusions about the real world implications of the current 
academic theory by Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams on CEO gender’s effect on firm 
value, as well as Core, Holthausen, Larcker’s conclusions on how salary interacts with 
value creation. An overwhelmingly negative display of abnormal returns combined 
with a lack of sensitivity to the results of CEO characteristics regressions would 
indicate investors are indifferent to whether a CEO has supposedly positive 
characteristics and instead believe that the shock of a new CEO taking over 
overshadows any benefits the individual may bring in the short term. Conversely, 
negative or positive returns with large amounts of variation would indicate that certain 
qualities about these CEOs caused investors to anticipate firm improvements. This 
result opens up the option to examine some of the basic CEO characteristics that have 
been researched in studies cited above; such as gender, and see how these factors 
played into the abnormal returns observed using the cross-sectional data provided by 
my event study.  
My analysis points to CEO announcements in the S&P 500 resulting in a small 
but statistically significant drop in mean firm value, around .2%. Utilizing the firm-by-
firm abnormal returns results, I validate the existing findings on CEO gender and 
salary. Gender is insignificant to abnormal returns, while higher salaries result in 
negative returns. Age results in negative abnormal returns for CEOs in their forties, and 
positive returns for those older than that. I conclude that this has to do with age being 
representative of experience, with markets assuming a certain level of experience is 
necessary to lead a company. My study points to this minimum experience level lying 
somewhere in one’s fifties.  
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The next section contains a review of the existing literature surrounding how 
CEOs affect company value and CEO traits that impact firm performance. I then 
discuss my data set and its limitations in Section III. Sections IV and V present event 
study methodology and regression results. Finally I conclude my paper by addressing 
areas for improvement and further study. 
II. Literature Review 
Current literature looking into whether CEOs actually impact firm performance 
is divided, with scholars debating whether they act as mere figureheads or actual 
leaders that determine company strategy. A recent study by Mackey (2008) sums up the 
arguments and examines variance in firm performance based on CEO heterogeneity. 
Mackey concludes that CEOs impact corporate performance on a significant level, with 
corporate profits variance being affected up to 29.2 percent by CEO effects. Past 
research into the direct effect of CEOs on firm value has presented mixed results. 
Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) in their research on 1,689 firms from the Value Line 
Investment Survey from 1984 find that CEO changes undergone due to duress exhibit 
positive abnormal stock returns, while unforced retirements do not exhibit 
economically significant results. Worrell Davidson and Glasscock (1993) in their study 
on executive appointments resulting from firings find that outsider appointments 
exhibit significant stock price reactions, while insider appointments have no significant 
results. Renee et al (2005) find positive correlation between decision making power of 
CEOs and stock price variability.  
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Bennedsen et al. (2007) choose to empirically test the impact a CEO has on 
their firm in a different manner. Their methodology for answering this question 
revolves around a sample of 6,753 firms in Denmark who had CEOs experience death 
or the death of a family member from 1994 to 2002. Their rationale is that if a CEO 
dies and is replaced, or a current CEO is hit with an extreme life shock like that of a 
family member’s death, then firm performance will suffer if CEOs actually matter to 
firm performance. Their study resulted in the finding that the CEO and family deaths 
cause significant declines in firms. This manifests in Operating Return On Assets, a 
figure measuring EBIT divided by average total assets, dropping by 0.9 percent in the 
two years around the death. The study also noted that deaths of board members and 
their immediate families did not have any of the effects that the shocks on CEOs 
showed. This research demonstrates that shocks in the life of a key executive can result 
in nearly a one percent decrease in firm profitability holding all else constant, again 
pointing to the direct impact CEOs have on firms. These studies confirm that while not 
in all cases, CEOs have the capacity to affect their firm values. Knowing this the 
natural question arises, what qualities or characteristics of CEOs influence these value 
changes most? 
One of the initial studies in this area was performed by Bertrand and Schoar 
(2002) who attempt to answer the very basic question of whether different managerial 
characteristics have an effect on firm value. In their paper they focus on testing two 
qualities of CEOs, their age and whether they have an MBA, and how those affect firm 
behavior in investment, financial, and organizational policy. Through their empirical 
study of 600 American firms and 500 managers, they conclude that age of CEOs is 
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positively correlated with lower risk business practices, and that CEOs with MBAs 
display higher corporate performance and returns on operating assets. 
Along with age and education, CEO gender has been examined as a trait 
affecting firm returns by Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams (2009). Using a sample of 
70 female CEO appointments between 1985 and 2007 matched with 70 male CEO 
appointments they run an event study on announcement dates. Their study finds that 
markets have no bias towards gender, as indicated by the positive abnormal returns for 
both male and female announcements. I believe it is important to note that though their 
results displayed positive returns for CEO announcements, their relatively small sample 
size across over 20 years makes it difficult to assume their results apply to all 
announcements. I seek to remedy this in my study by using all CEO announcements in 
the S&P 500 across 6 years, allowing me to draw conclusions about large firms.  
Aside from basic characteristics, research has also examined manager 
characteristics pertaining to skillsets, CEO backgrounds, and physical attributes as well.  
Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2008) observe the characteristics of CEOs of 
private equity firms, paying particular attention to both the general ability of the 
managers, as well as team vs. execution skills, which were judged in a survey of thirty 
different CEO characteristics. To measure CEO success they classify it as when a CEO 
guides a company to a successful IPO or other sale while maintaining positive press 
pertaining to its operations. Overall, the analysis of the data led to two major 
conclusions. First the obvious one that CEOs with a higher overall rating for general 
ability are more successful than those with a lower ability score. Second and more 
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intriguing is that success is positively related to execution skills, while being overall 
unrelated to team-related skills. This suggests that skills related to execution should 
positively affect firm value, skills such as analytics and proactivity will affect firm 
value in a positive way. 
Due to the difficulty of quantifying skills, further research has been directed to 
the observation of factors that may affect the execution skills of CEOs. Benmelech and 
Frydman (2014) examine the effect on firms of CEOs with military service. Using their 
sample of 1,106 executives with military service they conclude that CEOs with military 
backgrounds have a higher level of performance during times of distress in their 
industry. Empirically this means that CEOs from the military 70% of company decline 
that can be attributed to due industry wide effects. The authors theorize that military 
training and experience specifically target an individual’s ability to function under 
pressure, leading to better decision making in stressful times. Again this relates directly 
back to the Kaplan et al study, relating the military experience of CEOs with an 
increased amount of execution skills that in the long run bolster firm value. 
Continuing research into specific manager characteristics, Limbach and 
Sonnenburg (2014) examine whether fitness of CEOs leads to greater firm value. Using 
marathon completion within a year as an indicator of fitness, their panel of 9,500 firm-
year observations indicates with significant results that fit CEOs do lead to higher firm 
value in a range of 4-10%. The rationale behind this vast increase in firm value runs 
along the same logic as military experience. The researchers note that running has been 
shown to relieve stress that can result from the rigors an executive’s lifestyle as well as 
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boosting performance. This paper feeds back into the findings that execution skills of 
CEOs lead to greater firm value, and fit CEOs will execute in a superior manner than 
those who are unfit.  
Custodio and Metzger (2013) investigate how CEOs of non-finance firms with 
past experience as a financial professional affect firm policy. In their work they define a 
financial professional as an executive who has worked in a finance related firm such as 
accounting, or banking, or worked in a finance related positon such as a CFO. Their 
findings indicate that these types of CEO act in ways benefit the firm on a financial 
basis such as adapting firm leverage to current market conditions, and overall 
benefitting shareholders.   
When addressing the issue of CEO salary and how that may factor into firm 
value, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) discover that higher salaries are linked to 
companies that have larger problems with how they govern their firm. These problems 
with governance are linked to higher CEO salaries, while at the same time manifest in 
negative firm performance and returns. 
Through my research I will contribute an empirical test to evaluate the 
conclusions of previous research on stock market reactions to CEO announcements. 
Furthermore once I reach a conclusion on how CEO announcements affect S&P 500 
sized public companies, I will continue to test how CEO age and gender affect 
abnormal returns. This will validate the results found by Martin, Nishikawa, and 
Williams and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker by using a larger sample of firms, as well 
as adding a data on the way CEO age affects firm returns, which has not been studied. 
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III. Hypothesis Development 
 Based upon the original literature, I develop four hypotheses regarding the results 
of my tests. First regarding the abnormal returns related to CEO announcements, the 
existing literature has indicated a broad range of returns in past studies, and I believe my 
study, being broad and over a large time period, will have an abnormal returns close to 
zero. However I also believe that there will be significant variation in the abnormal 
returns created by CEO announcements, and that these will create the opportunity to test 
gender, age, and salary’s effects on stock price. 
 Concerning the effect of gender on abnormal returns, I defer to the previous study 
by Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams, and predict that CEO gender should have no 
statistically significant effect upon firm return. I also acknowledge that my low amount of 
female CEO announcements will not allow me to make a strong conclusion either way.  
 I hypothesize for age’s effect on abnormal returns that there will be a negative 
correlation between increasing age and declining abnormal returns. There has no research 
regarding this specific variable interaction that I am aware of, and I believed that older 
CEOs would be perceived as less capable of decisive action by markets, leading to lower 
estimations of their ability to make critical decisions for their companies, leading to less 
value.  
 The existing literature on CEO salary indicates that as CEOs are paid more, their 
effectiveness towards creating value decreases. However, I believe that there must be 
some level that this begins at, and predict that CEO salary will only begin to show 
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negative abnormal returns once it reaches a certain level, and once that level is reached it 
will display negative abnormal returns as salary increases. 
IV. Data 
My data set captures all announcements of CEO appointments in the Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) 500 index of companies from January 1st 2000 to December 31st 
2006, a time period during which no company changed its CEO more than once. Firm 
membership in the S&P 500 is observed on January 1st 2000. Because of this the 
analysis that compares the abnormal return associated with hiring to CEO 
characteristics is cross sectional. This data originates primarily from 2 sources. To find 
all CEO changes in the 6 year period in the S&P 500, data was gathered from 
Compustat’s Execucomp database which is comprised of executive compensation data 
from 1962 to the present day. Compustat data for all executives was downloaded from 
the database. This data was then sorted first by S&P 500 companies, and then whether 
or not a CEO change had taken place, with companies that did not elect new CEOs 
being eliminated from the dataset, narrowing my sample down from 2365 observations 
to 121. I then used the Center for Research in Security Prices database to obtain daily 
stock data for each company that was left. I also obtained daily Fama-French factor 
data for the companies using the Kenneth French’s website database via Wharton 
Research Data Services. Additional data on CEO announcements was gathered from 
company website archives, SEC documents, and financial news publications.  This left 
me with a data set containing 121 different CEO changes over a period of 6 years, with 
no companies having changed their CEO more than once. For my test on gender and 
14 
 
age’s effects on abnormal returns, I use data downloaded from Execucomp. For 
complete data summary statistics see appendix tables 1,2 and 3. 
 My data set provides several advantages. First the use of the S&P 500 gives me a 
large and diverse sample of firms for my event study. Though the S&P 500 only 
encapsulates relatively large public firms, it does represent a significant portion of the 
overall economy, as well as having a large amount of daily historical data to work with. 
Furthermore because I am examining the market reaction to CEO appointments, the 
well-known and frequently traded companies on the S&P 500 are likely to display 
larger reactions in stock price, whereas less recognizable companies under less scrutiny 
may not show significant trading reactions to CEO announcements.  The most 
significant disadvantage of my dataset lies in the announcement date binary variable. 
Though announcement dates were gathered from reliable sources, there is always the 
possibility that rumors and investor expectations about new CEOs could have been 
factored into stock prices before the “official” announcements of CEOs are released. 
Due to the uncertain nature of exactly when news reaches the public, official company 
press releases are used as the event dates for the study. A further disadvantage of the 
data is the lack of small market cap companies, which limits our conclusions to only 
large firms. Finally our sample has only 2 events where female CEOs were elected. 
This small sample size makes any conclusions about the effects of gender on abnormal 
returns very tentative. 
 Out of my data set several variables warrant more specific definition. Excess 
Return On Market is defined as a value-weight return on the NYSE, AMEX and 
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NASDAQ stocks, with the one-month treasury bill rate subtracted. The mean value for 
excess returns for companies analyzed is 7.92E-06%, with a standard deviation of 1%.  
Abnormal Returns for a firm are calculated in a 3 day window centered on CEO 
announcement dates. Abnormal returns in this event study are estimated on a per-firm 
basis and are the coefficient on the announcement date dummy variable. I use four 
Fama-French factors in my regression, the Small Minus Big, and High Minus Low 
variables the excess market return factor, as well as Carhart’s momentum factor. Our 
Small Minus Big variable is the average return of three small portfolios, a small value, 
neutral, and growth, minus the average return on three big portfolios of the same type. 
The High Minus Low variable is the average return from a large value and small value 
portfolio minus the average return from two corresponding growth portfolios. The 
excess return on market factor is calculated by taking the firms expected market returns 
based on their market index, and then subtracting that from their actual returns on that 
day.  Carhart’s Momentum variable measures the tendency for a stock to follow its 
current price trend, whether it is increasing or decreasing in value. It is calculated using 
the average return of two previous high return portfolios subtracted from the average of 
two previous low return portfolios. This variable is important to have because stock 
momentum can explain stock price movement around announcement dates, and should 
be accounted for when running the event study.  Momentum has a mean of .0002 with a 
standard deviation of .0098. My CEO salary variable is the salary of the CEO for the 
fiscal year they were appointed in, with an average of 750 thousand dollars. The above 
and below average salary variables encompass all salaries above and below the average. 
I also employ a dummy variable in my study with a value of 1 for CEO announcement 
16 
 
dates. I am able to do this due to none of the companies changing CEOs more than once 
during the 6 year period I drawing my data from.  
V. Empirical Method 
In order to investigate CEO announcement effects on firm value, I conduct an 
event study using a full Fama-French Factor Regression model. Seen below is the basic 
form of my regression: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡 × +𝛾𝑖1𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖3𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 represents expected excess returns on stock i at time t. This variable is 
calculated by subtracting holding period returns for a stock from the risk free rate of 
return, given by one month treasury bills. 𝛼𝑖 represents a firms expected return if the 
market return rate is zero. 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑡 is the excess return on the market at time t, and factors 
in the systematic risk 𝛽  of each firm. The next 2 variables represent Fama-French 
factors for time t in the S&P 500. 𝛾𝑖1𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 represents our Small minus Big Returns 
factor, and 𝛾𝑖2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 represents the High Minus Low factor. 𝛾𝑖3𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 represents the 
Carhart Momentum variable, and  𝐷𝑖 represents the CEO announcement date dummy 
variable. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents the unexplained error in my regression. 
 Event studies are regressions designed to estimate the effect of announcements 
and news on firms, specifically via changes in their stock value. This is accomplished 
by regressing out dependent variable D on the independent variables included in our 
regression such as age, gender, and salary. The coefficient on D for each firm 
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represents the daily abnormal returns on that firm’s stock during the event window. To 
increase the predictive power of my regression, I include both Fama-French and 
Carhart factors. Fama-French factors are ideal for event studies due to how they capture 
average stock returns much more effectively than other estimation models, using 
measures of portfolio size and book-to-market equity (Fama and French 1992), while 
Carhart’s Momentum factor helps explain trends in stock prices.  
The results from my initial regression can be seen in table 4. These results are 
the averages of all firm specific coefficients on each variable, letting us see the overall 
results of the sample. In this table we observe that the event dummy variable which 
represents announcement dates has a negative value of .2% that is statistically 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that in the S&P 500, CEO announcements affect 
stock returns, and therefore firm value, in a small but negative way on average. 
However, due to the mean value coefficient being so close to zero and having a 
comparatively large standard deviation, the potential for positive abnormal returns is 
high. The 50/69 split between positive and negative abnormal returns confirms that 
there is still a large amount of variability in these announcements, as seen in table 2. 
For the remaining regressions in my paper, I created a second data set where the 
coefficient on each firm’s dummy variable is paired with traits of the CEO being 
announced on that date. In this paper I use gender, CEO age, and initial salary as 
characteristics to be attached to each announcement.  
After obtaining the abnormal returns resulting from CEO announcements, I 
regress CEO age and gender on abnormal returns using this general form: 
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𝐴𝑅 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑚𝑖 + 𝐵1𝑌𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖 is abnormal returns for firm i, 𝑎𝑖 is a firm specific intercept, 𝑚𝑖 is a binary 
variable that equals 1 when a CEO is female, 𝑌𝑖 is CEO age and 𝐵1is the coefficient on 
CEO age, and 𝐵2𝑆𝑖 is CEO beginning salary. With this regression I test the existing 
conclusions on how the gender and age of CEOs affects firm value. To do this multiple 
regressions are run building on the base model. The regression results from my base 
model can be seen in table 5. The main purpose of these regressions to observe the 
nature of each traits interaction with firm value. To test the relative importance a vast 
sample of CEO traits would need to be gathered, which is beyond the capacity of my 
study. As seen in the coefficients of the regression, CEO age and gender have very little 
effect on firm value, explaining a small percentage of the abnormal returns. These 
results confirm the findings of Martins Nishikawa and Williams (date), that male and 
female CEOs have no noticeable differences in their respective market reactions, with 
an observable change of -.1% in abnormal returns being economically negligible. An 
interesting thought is that there could be gender discrimination in the search for CEOs, 
but once a female becomes CEO the market is gender blind. I must restate that due to a 
lack of female CEOs being announced, confidence in my results is very low. 
 To test the effects of age, first a regression with CEO age and a variable of CEO 
age squared was run, with results in table 6. CEO age demonstrated a positive 
correlation overall, while age squared resulted in an incredibly low negative coefficient. 
Due to the economically insignificant size of the squared age coefficient we can 
conclude that age does not follow an exponential curve. To further investigate the effect 
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of CEO age, the variable was split into 3 brackets broken down into dummy variables 
encompassing ages 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69. The results from these regressions are 
seen in table 7. CEOs who lie within the 40s bracket exhibit a negative coefficient on 
their variable, while CEOs in their 50s and 60s result in positive coefficients. I believe 
these results stem from market beliefs in CEO abilities and their relation to age. 
Negative coefficients on CEOs in their 40s may result from investors interpreting age 
as accumulated experience, relating to the findings of Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen. 
If markets believe that the accumulation and development of execution skills discussed 
in Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen’s paper is insufficient in CEOs in their 40s the 
negative coefficients is logical. Following this logic the positive coefficients for CEOs 
in their 50s and 60s lead to the conclusion that there exists a level of experience, 
measured via age, that markets believe CEOs need to have a positive impact on firm 
returns.  
 Similar to the way I tested the effect of age, I broke salary into two categories, 
above and below the mean of 750,000. I then regress both variables on abnormal 
returns. The results from these regressions are found in table 8. As predicted by Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker, above average salaries possess negative coefficients when I 
regress my dependent variable upon my independent variable salary, while below 
average salaries are associated with positive abnormal returns. To confirm the 
robustness of my results and eliminate the potential that abnormal returns could have 
been influenced by other factors, I regress each salary variable on only positive and 
only negative returns, with results in table 9 and 10. Three out of the four tests confirm 
the prior results, with negative abnormal returns showing a positive coefficient for 
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above average salaries and a negative one for above average salaries. On the other hand 
both salary variables are negative when regressed on positive abnormal returns. I 
believe this occurs because once positive abnormal returns are occurring the only way 
to affect them via salary is to decrease the salary, while negative abnormal returns can 
be dampened by decreasing salary but worsened by increasing it. I believe an 
economically sound way to utilize this trend is the established practice of linking CEO 
compensation to stock options. This not only reduces CEO salaries, but also provides 
incentive to increase firm value (Hamid 1995) 
 The results of the regressions from my study are consistent with data trends 
established in existing literature. Characteristics that affect the execution abilities of 
CEOs like older age brackets are associated with positive abnormal returns mirroring 
past studies on traits like age, military experience, and fitness. On the other hand 
qualities unrelated to execution ability like gender are largely irrelevant. Our results 
also corroborate the conclusion of Martins Nishikawa and Williams that markets appear 
to be gender blind when predicting CEO success, and those of Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker that higher salaries lead to reductions in firm value. 
VI. Conclusion 
 Chief Executive Officers are entrusted with the strategic direction of their 
respective companies, and ultimately bear responsibility to company equity holders for 
the success or failure they create. They are also compensated accordingly, receiving 
over 300 times the pay of the average production/non-supervisory worker in the United 
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States. Current literature has examined CEO characteristics and the effect they have on 
firm value. With this type of data, both company shareholders and prospective investors 
make superior decisions when evaluating potential CEOs. Previous studies have 
examined narrow sets of data while I focus on a broad data set to derive more 
explanatory power. Consequently my study attempts to validate the current conclusions 
on how CEO gender affects firm value, and add the effects of CEO age among large 
public companies to the existing body of literature. 
 With a data set made up of all CEO changes within the S&P 500 between January 
2000 and December 2006 I conduct a Fama-French Factor event study, examining the 
abnormal stock returns from firms during CEO announcements, and use that data to test 
the effect of age and gender on those abnormal returns. The results from my first 
regression indicate that CEO announcements on average result in negative firm returns, 
with a standard deviation allowing for large negative and positive swings. Increasing 
the event window of my study validated the robustness of my results.  
 Using cross-sectional regressions on the abnormal returns data from the event 
study I confirmed the findings of existing literature that CEO gender has an 
economically insignificant effect on firm value. This underlines the encouraging fact 
that markets appear to be gender blind when evaluating a CEO’s potential to create 
value. I believe that this stems from markets realizing that past experience and 
execution skills are the drivers of value creation. The results on CEO age’s effect on 
firm return support this theory with the youngest bracket of CEO ages resulting in 
negative abnormal returns, while older brackets lead to positive returns. Previous 
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literature points to execution skills of CEOs being the only relevant characteristics that 
create firm value, and I believe age to be a measure of accumulated experience. 
Therefore a higher age should, holding all else constant, result in a higher firm return 
due to increased execution skills.  
 The results of my study should assist both investors and firms in their decision 
making around CEOs. In regards to firms during their searches for CEOs, they should 
make sure to select CEOs with large amounts of experience, while also disregarding 
any non-execution related characteristics when eliminating candidates. Basing decision-
making along these lines will help maximize firm value, and justify the enormous 
responsibility and compensation given to these individuals. From and investor 
perspective, evaluation of current and potential CEOs for companies along the same 
lines allows optimized investment decisions.  
 I believe further research should be directed into evaluation of a broad panel of 
characteristics related to execution ability such as past education, past work experience, 
industry specific knowledge, and performance in times of economic downturns. A 
broad sample of data would allow the ranking of characteristics by impact on firm 
value rather than simply the general effect each variable has on abnormal returns as 
demonstrated in my study. Furthermore including firm characteristics such as industry, 
size, market capitalization, and others would allow observation of how CEO 
characteristics interact with different types of firm. Determining the ranking of 
importance in these characteristics as well as what matches best with each kind of firm 
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would increase the selection efficiency of CEOs, while at the same time maximizing 
firm value to an even greater degree.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII. Appendix 
p 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price Ask 39.56754 29.46874 -14.475 553.86
Shares Outstanding 474676.9 895043.1 0 6899752
Rreturns Without Dividends 0.07% 2.74% -47.50% 89.47%
Excess Return On Market 0.00% 1.16% -6.72% 5.43%
Small Minus Big 0.02% 0.63% -4.62% 2.96%
High Minus Low 0.05% 0.66% -4.86% 3.36%
Risk Free Rate (1 Month T-Bills) 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.03%
Momentum 0.03% 0.98% -7.24% 5.13%
Holding Period Returns 0.07% 2.73% -47.50% 89.47%
Appendix Table 1
Summary Statistics for First Regression Variables
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Appendix Table 3 
Gender Variable Summary Statistics 
      
Variable Observations Frequency 
      
Female 2 1.64% 
Male 117 98.36% 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Initial Event Study Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient 
  Excess Return On Market (%) 1.056054*** 
 
(0.006143) 
  Small Minus Big (%) 0.196245*** 
 
(0.010004) 
  High Minus Low (%) 0.4721649*** 
 
(0.0114347) 
  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Abnormal Returns -0.26% 1.82% -6.07% 12.74%
Positive Abnormal Returns 0.88% 1.79% 0.02% 12.74%
Negative Abnormal Returns -1.08% 1.35% -6.07% 0.00%
CEO Salary (Thousands) 749.18 565.59 56.67 5613.20
Below Average Salary (Thousands) 512.70 193.09 56.67 742.31
Above Average Salary (Thousands) 1043.46 721.58 750.00 5613.20
Appendix Table 2
Summary Statistics for Second Regression Variables
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Momentum (%) -0.1469383*** 
 
(0.0061614) 
  Event Dummy (%) -0.0026151** 
 
(0.0013227) 
  Variables with a significance of  p<.01 are marked with a triple asterisk ***, ** for p<.05, and * for p<.1 
Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses 
 
Table 5 
Regression of CEO Age and Gender On Abnormal Returns 
Variable Coefficient 
    
CEO Age*** 0.0005242*** 
  (0.0003147) 
    
Male -0.0090602 
  (0.0129376) 
    
Variables with a significance of  p<.01 are marked with a triple asterisk ***, ** for p<.05, and * for p<.1 
Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Regression of CEO Age and CEO Age Squared On Abnormal Returns 
Variable Coefficient 
    
CEO Age 0.0059541 
  (0.0051708) 
    
CEO Age Squared -0.0000492 
  (0.0000468) 
Variables with a significance of  p<.01 are marked with a triple asterisk ***, ** for p<.05, and * for p<.1 
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Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses 
 
Table 7 
Regression of CEO Age Brackets On Abnormal Returns 
Variable Coefficient 
    
40-49 CEOs -0.0063166 
  (0.0047629) 
    
50-59 CEOs 0.0031217 
  (0.0034507) 
    
60-69 CEOs 0.0002189 
  (0.0039585) 
Variables with a significance of  p<.01 are marked with a triple asterisk ***, ** for p<.05, and * for p<.1 
Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses 
 
Table 8 
Regression of CEO Salary Categories on Abnormal Returns 
Variable Coefficient 
    
Below Average Salary  5.14e-06 
  ( 9.33e-06) 
    
Above Average Salary -6.44e-07 
  (2.78e-06 ) 
Variables with a significance of  p<.01 are marked with a triple asterisk ***, ** for p<.05, and * for p<.1 
Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses 
 
Table 9 
Regression of CEO Salary Categories on Positive Abnormal Returns 
Variable Coefficient 
    
Below Average Salary   -4.36e-07 
  (7.09e-06) 
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Above Average Salary -2.53e-06 
  (8.05e-06) 
Variables with a significance of  p<.01 are marked with a triple asterisk ***, ** for p<.05, and * for p<.1 
Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses 
 
Table 10 
Regression of CEO Salary Categories on Negative Abnormal Returns 
Variable Coefficient 
    
Below Average Salary  -2.63e-06 
  (0.0000108) 
    
Above Average Salary 7.60e-07 
  (2.88e-06 ) 
Variables with a significance of  p<.01 are marked with a triple asterisk ***, ** for p<.05, and * for p<.1 
Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses 
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